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WHEN ANTITRUST MET FACEBOOK 
Christopher S. Yoo* 
INTRODUCTION 
Social networks are among the hottest phenomena on the Internet. Fa-
cebook eclipsed Google as the most visited website in both 2010 and 2011.1 
Moreover, according to Nielsen estimates, as of the end of 2011 the average 
American spent nearly seven hours per month on Facebook, which is more 
time than they spent on Google, Yahoo!, YouTube, Microsoft, and Wikipe-
dia combined.2 LinkedIn’s May 19, 2011 initial public offering (“IPO”) 
surpassed expectations, placing the value of the company at nearly $9 bil-
lion,3 and approximately a year later, its stock price had risen another 20 
percent.4 Facebook followed suit a year later with an IPO that placed the 
value of the company at over $100 billion.5 Other social networking sites 
remain hot properties, and other Internet companies are struggling to catch 
up. 
In what may be considered a rite of passage previously faced by such 
high-tech giants as IBM, AT&T, Microsoft, and most recently Google, so-
cial networking companies are now facing increasing scrutiny under the 
antitrust laws.6 Early private antitrust cases have begun to appear.7  
  
 * John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information Science and 
Founding Director of the Center for Technology, Innovation & Competition, University of Pennsylva-
nia. The author would like to thank the Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation for its financial support 
for this project. 
 1 Press Release, Experian Hitwise, Facebook Was the Top Search Term for Third Straight Year 
(Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://www.experian.com/hitwise/press-release-facebook-was-the-top-
search-term-for-2011.html. 
 2 December 2011—Top U.S. Web Brands, NIELSEN WIRE (Jan. 25, 2012), http://blog.nielsen.
com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/december-2011-top-u-s-web-brands. 
 3 Stu Woo et al., LinkedIn IPO Soars, Feeding Web Boom, WALL ST. J., May 20, 2011, at A1. 
 4 Compare id. (showing LinkedIn stock at $94.25 after its first day of trading, May 19, 2011), 
with LinkedIn Corp.: Historical Prices, GOOGLE FIN., http://www.google.com/finance/
historical?q=NYSE:LNKD (last visited July 8, 2012) (reporting that LinkedIn’s stock closed at $113.49 
on May 16, 2012, about one year after its IPO). 
 5 Jessica Guynn, Facebook’s Future Rests on Founder, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012, at B1. But see 
Andrew Bary, Facebook Flops: Look Out Below!, BARRONS.COM (May 19, 2012), http://online.bar
rons.com/article/SB50001424053111904571704577410421435718852.html (explaining that Facebook 
achieved a “$100-plus billion market value” with its May 18, 2012 IPO, but noting that the “lack of a 
big ‘pop’” for the stock during initial trading suggests this valuation may fizzle over time). 
 6 See Amir Efrati, Antitrust Regulator Makes Twitter Inquiries, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2011, at B3; 
Jia Lynn Yang, Dangerous Waters? Facebook’s Link to Online Games Has Some Charging the Social 
Network Has Waded into Antitrust Territory, DAILY HERALD (Chi.), June 30, 2011, § 3, at 1; J. Thomas 
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Anyone attempting to predict how the antitrust laws will apply to lead-
ing social networking providers must remember that a successful monopo-
lization claim requires proof of two elements: (1) market power and (2) 
what is often called exclusionary conduct.8 This Article offers a few prelim-
inary thoughts about whether leading social networking sites satisfy these 
requirements. Part I considers one of the most likely sources of market 
power: network effects. Part II evaluates whether a social network’s refusal 
to facilitate data portability can create an entry barrier and constitute exclu-
sionary conduct. Part III examines Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc.,9 
which is a recent case that presented both of these issues. 
I. NETWORK EFFECTS 
Perhaps the most commonly cited source of market power in high-tech 
industries is network effects.10 Network effects exist when the value of a 
network depends on the number of other users connected to the network. 
The more people that an individual subscriber can reach through the net-
work, the more valuable the network becomes.11 In United States v. Mi-
crosoft Corp.,12 network effects formed the basis for the U.S. government’s 
case.13 They also played a prominent role in early explorations of whether 
leading social networking sites should be subject to antitrust scrutiny.14 
Although many analyses presume that the presence of network effects 
necessarily creates monopoly power, I have discussed the theoretical ambi-
  
Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Intel, Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Facebook: Observations on 
Antitrust and the High-Tech Sector: Address Before the ABA Antitrust Section Fall Forum 4-6, 8-10, 
16-17 (Nov. 18, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/101118fallforum.pdf. 
 7 E.g., LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 F. App’x 554, 556 (9th Cir. 2008); Facebook, 
Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-5780 JF (RS), 2009 WL 3429568, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 
2009) (order granting motion to dismiss counterclaim and strike affirmative defenses and vacating 
hearing date). 
 8 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602-604 (1985); 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam); HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 276-77 (3d ed. 2005). 
 9 No. C 08-5780 JF (RS), 2009 WL 3429568, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2009) (order granting 
motion to dismiss counter-complaint and strike affirmative defenses and vacating hearing date). 
 10 For an overview, see Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network 
Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 503-04 (1998). 
 11 DANIEL F. SPULBER & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, NETWORKS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: 
ECONOMICS AND LAW 120 (2009). 
 12 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam); 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 13 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 49-50, 55-56; Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 939, 953. 
 14 See LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06-6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, at 
*8-10 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007), aff’d, 304 F. App’x 554 (9th Cir. 2008); Chris Butts, Comment, The 
Microsoft Case 10 Years Later: Antitrust and New Leading “New Economy” Firms, 8 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 275, 289-90 (2010); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
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guity of network effects elsewhere, pointing out that any such conclusion 
depends on a number of structural preconditions and may be mitigated by 
the actions of other actors.15 This Part emphasizes two additional points. 
Section A discusses how the leading models of network effects include 
assumptions that implicitly posit inexhaustible returns to scale. The tenden-
cy of networks to collapse into monopolies can disappear once one takes 
into account the possibility of congestion and associational costs as well as 
the fact that all network connections are not equally valuable. Section B 
discusses the as-yet largely unexplored literature analyzing how gateways 
and adapters can create bridges that connect networks. This literature at 
least suggests the possibility that alternative technologies can mitigate or 
even dissipate any market power that network effects may create. 
A. Inexhaustible Returns to Scale 
One facet of leading models of network effects is the manner in which 
they posit returns to scale that are inexhaustible. This Section first examines 
how this presumption is embodied on the supply side by the assumption 
that marginal costs are constant. Second, this Section discusses how this 
presumption is reflected on the demand side by positing that all network 
connections are equally valuable. As discussed below, the relaxation of 
either assumption can have a dramatic impact on whether network effects 
can give social networks monopoly power.  
1. Supply-Side Considerations: Non-Constant Marginal Cost 
On the supply side, the leading models on network effects typically as-
sume that marginal costs are constant.16 From a theoretical standpoint, the 
presence of constant marginal costs renders the economies of scale inex-
haustible.17 
Understanding how constant marginal costs lead to inexhaustible 
economies of scale is best accomplished by examining how the interplay of 
fixed and variable costs give the typical average cost curve its characteristic 
  
 15 These include the magnitude of potentially offsetting network externalities, market structure, 
the potential for market features or institutional forms to offset the impact of network effects, heteroge-
neous preferences, and significant growth in market sides. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration 
and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 278-85 (2002) (presenting the 
initial analysis); accord SPULBER & YOO, supra note 11, at 138-43 (providing additional analysis). 
 16 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of Inter-
faces, 40 J. INDUS. ECON. 9, 16 (1992); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the 
Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 829 (1986). 
 17 S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market 
Failure?, 17 RES. IN L. & ECON. 1, 14-15 (1995). 
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“U” shape. Fixed costs place consistent downward pressure on average cost 
as those fixed costs are amortized over increasing quantities, although the 
magnitude of this downward pressure decays logarithmically as production 
increases.18 Variable costs are assumed initially to decline as increases in 
production allow firms to realize available economies of scale.19 During this 
period, both fixed and variable costs cause average cost to decline.20 Even-
tually, variable costs begin to increase as the cheapest sources of inputs are 
exhausted and as the increase in the production makes inputs more difficult 
to manage.21 Over time, the upward pressure associated with increases in 
variable cost dominates the ever-decaying downward pressure on average 
cost associated with the amortization of fixed cost, and the average cost 
curve begins to rise.22 After this point, competitors can no longer obtain a 
cost advantage simply by increasing production. 
These dynamics change dramatically if marginal cost is assumed to be 
constant. Under this assumption, variable cost never increases, and the only 
determinant of average cost is the downward pressure associated with the 
amortization of fixed costs over larger volumes. This means that average 
cost is constantly declining, and larger firms always enjoy a competitive 
advantage.23 
This advantage enjoyed by large networks may thus simply be the re-
sult of assumptions built into the models rather than a realistic representa-
tion of the cost curves associated with network industries. The expansion of 
social networks imposes congestion and organizational costs on their users 
because users’ newsfeeds become increasingly difficult to manage.24 In 
addition, large social networks make it harder for users to restrict certain 
communications to smaller subgroups, which in turn represents another 
type of cost.25 Together these considerations may result in the costs that end 
users face as social networks grow larger. The resulting diseconomies of 
scale can provide a counterweight to the advantages enjoyed by large social 
networks. 
  
 18 Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 226-27 
(2004). 
 19 Id. at 227. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 17, at 14-15. 
 24 Steven Levy, How Many Friends Is Too Many?, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 2008, at 15. 
 25 See id.; Sidney Hill, Choosy Users May Ditch Facebook for Smaller Social Networks, E-
COMMERCE TIMES (May 20, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/72495.html. 
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2. Demand-Side Considerations: Heterogeneous Value in Different 
Network Connections 
Even more importantly, models of network effects assume that all in-
creases in network size always cause the network to increase in value.26 
Indeed, making network value depend on the total number of available con-
nections effectively presumes that all network connections are equally val-
uable. 
Economic theorists have long recognized that heterogeneity of cus-
tomer preferences can offset the demand-side scale economies associated 
with network effects.27 To the extent that rival systems have distinct fea-
tures, multiple systems can survive by pursuing niche strategies that target 
customers who place a particular value on different types of networks.28 
Although one often thinks of such heterogeneity of preferences in 
terms of preferences for services,29 it can also be with respect to the identity 
of the people you can reach through a particular network.30 Put another way, 
the literature on network effects assumes that adding additional customers 
always makes a network more desirable no matter how large the network is 
already.31 Not only are increases in network value subject to the inevitable 
principle of diminishing marginal returns,32 but recent empirical studies 
have shown that the average Facebook user actively interacts with no more 
than a handful of people.33 Even if one expands the analysis to include weak 
  
 26 See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibil-
ity, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 426-27 (1985). 
 27 See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization and Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS 71, 71-72 
(1986); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP., 
Spring 1994, at 93, 106; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Con-
cern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 291-92 (1996). 
 28 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 27, at 106; see also Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 27, at 292 
(“Where there are differences in preferences regarding alternative standards, coexistence of standards is 
a likely outcome.”). 
 29 See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 63-64 (2005). 
 30 See MILTON L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE 20-29 (1997) (discussing heterogeneous 
preferences in telephone networks). 
 31 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 32 See, e.g., BRIDGER M. MITCHELL & INGO VOGELSANG, TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRICING: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 55 (1991); George Yarrow, Dealing with Social Obligations in Telecoms, in 
REGULATING UTILITIES: A TIME FOR CHANGE? 67, 75 (Stephen Sayer et al. eds., 1996). 
 33 See PAUL ADAMS, GROUPED: HOW SMALL GROUPS OF FRIENDS ARE THE KEY TO INFLUENCE 
ON THE WEB 23 (2012) (reporting an empirical study that the average Facebook user communicates with 
only four people per week and six people per month); Cameron Marlow, Maintained Relationships on 
Facebook, OVERSTATED (Mar. 9, 2009), http://overstated.net/2009/03/09/maintained-relationships-on-
facebook (reporting that male and female users with networks of 500 friends engage in mutual commu-
nication, on average, with only ten and sixteen other people, respectively); see generally Sam G. B. 
Roberts & Robin I. M. Dunbar, Communication in Social Networks: Effects of Kinship, Network Size, 
and Emotional Closeness, 18 PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 439, 450 (2011). 
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ties, studies indicate that the average social networking user is unable to 
maintain more than 150 connections at any particular time.34 
This confirms the intuition that end users are likely to place a particu-
larly high value on a small subgroup of people. The value of adding addi-
tional connections beyond this core group is much lower.35 Nor should the 
presence of a core group of close connections necessarily lead to lock-in. 
Given their small number, core group members should find it relatively 
easy to agree as to which network to join and to coordinate shifting to an-
other network should they find their current network inhospitable.36 
These concerns are reflected in the increasingly widespread commen-
tary that Facebook is becoming too big, as well as in the growing attraction 
of social networking services that are more targeted.37 Indeed, the original 
conception of Facebook was to support interaction with a smaller group of 
close friends rather than connectivity to a wide universe of end users.38 In 
its current form, many regard Facebook as being better suited to identifying 
and renewing weak and distant connections than it is to organizing a close 
group of friends.39 
Put somewhat differently, social networks offer a particular user sig-
nificantly less value when they expand to include subscribers who rely on 
languages that a specific user does not speak. Even users who share a com-
mon language may find little value if their interests do not overlap.  
The widespread differences in the value that users place on particular 
connections represent another deviation from the inexhaustible returns to 
scale posited in the literature.40 As long as a user can obtain access to his 
  
 34 See, e.g., Thomas V. Polett et al., Use of Social Network Sites and Instant Messaging Does Not 
Lead to Increased Offline Social Network Size, or to Emotionally Closer Relationships with Offline 
Network Members, 14 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY BEHAV. & SOC. NETWORKING 253, 254-55 (2011); Bruno 
Gonçalves et al., Modeling Users’ Activity on Twitter Networks: Validation of Dunbar’s Number, PLOS 
ONE, Aug. 3, 2011, at 1, 1, available at http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%
2Fjournal.pone.0022656. For the seminal study, see R.I.M. Dunbar, Coevolution of Neocortical Size, 
Group Size and Language in Humans, 16 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 681, 685-87 (1993). 
 35 See, e.g., Bob Briscoe et al., Metcalfe’s Law Is Wrong: Communications Networks Increase in 
Value as They Add Members—But by How Much? The Devil Is in the Details, IEEE SPECTRUM, July 
2006, at 34, 37. In addition, increases in network size may cause the cost of excluding others from the 
network to rise as well. Rahul Tongia & Ernest J. Wilson III, Turning Metcalfe on His Head: The Mul-
tiple Costs of Network Exclusion 20 (Sept. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Carnegie 
Institute of Technology). 
 36 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 17, at 18-19. 
 37 See, e.g., Jenna Wortham & Claire Cain Miller, Social Networks Offer a Way to Narrow the 
Field of Friends, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2011, at B1; J.J. Sutherland, In Other Social Network News. How 
About Fewer Friends?, NPR (Nov. 15, 2010, 10:09 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2010/11/15/131327991/in-other-social-network-news-how-about-fewer-friends. 
 38 Sidney Hill, Is Facebook Too Big for Its Own Good?, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Sept. 5, 2011, 5:00 
AM), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/73216.html?wlc=1315770981. 
 39 See id. 
 40 See MUELLER, supra note 30, at 27. 
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core group of connections, further expansions of network size will provide 
little-to-no value. 
B. Gateways 
Another oft-overlooked consideration that can mitigate the problems 
associated with network effects is the presence of gateways between net-
works (also sometimes called adapters or converters). Indeed, Professors 
Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro explored such a possibility in one of the 
seminal articles on network effects.41 Katz and Shapiro concluded that “if 
the costs of adapting are negligible, and there are no other entry barriers, 
the market will be perfectly competitive.”42 Carmen Matutes and Pierre 
Regibeau similarly concluded that if adapters exist that allow different ac-
tors to decide unilaterally whether their components are compatible with 
other systems, “compatibility arises and is always socially optimal provided 
that there are no costs to achieving standardization.”43 Professor Paul David 
(writing with Julie Bunn) likewise concluded that “initial technical incom-
patibilities between variant formulations of such technologies . . . can have 
their economic importance mitigated as a result of the ex post introduction 
of gateway technology.”44 The related literature on multihoming also sug-
gests that the ability to connect to multiple networks places a natural limita-
tion on any one network’s ability to exercise market power.45 
Together these analyses suggest that creating gateways between social 
networks can dissipate any monopoly power enjoyed by any particular so-
cial network. Thus, like increasing costs and heterogeneity in the value of 
network connections, the presence of gateways between social networks 
may well ameliorate anticompetitive concerns that they could pose. 
These conclusions depend on the assumption that adapters achieve 
perfect compatibility.46 Katz and Shapiro also subjected their conclusion to 
the caveat that the introduction of adapters may not be socially optimal if 
competition dissipates the rents necessary to support creating the network in 
the first place.47 
  
 41 See generally Katz & Shapiro, supra note 26, at 425. 
 42 Id. at 439. 
 43 Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau, “Mix and Match”: Product Compatibility Without Net-
work Externalities, 19 RAND J. ECON. 221, 232 (1988). 
 44 Paul A. David & Julie Ann Bunn, The Economics of Gateway Technologies and Network Evo-
lution: Lessons from Electricity Supply Industry, 3 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 165, 197 (1988). 
 45 Stanley Besen et al., Advances in Routing Technologies and Internet Peering Agreements, 91 
AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 292, 294-95 (2001). 
 46 See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 26, at 435-36 (assuming that the adapter permits presumably 
perfect compatibility); Matutes & Regibeau, supra note 43, at 223 (same). 
 47 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 26, at 439 n.14. 
1154 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 19:5 
Professors Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner presented a model that 
enabled them to explore the implications of relaxing both of these assump-
tions.48 After first confirming Katz and Shapiro’s conclusion that costless 
and perfect gateways eliminate any adverse impact of network effects,49 
Farrell and Saloner demonstrated that the welfare impact is ambiguous 
when gateways are imperfect.50 Specifically, consistent with the spirit of the 
Katz and Shapiro caveat discussed above, Farrell and Saloner concluded 
that if network effects are so important that the network should be standard-
ized, adapters can reduce welfare by making it easier for people not to unify 
on the standard.51 On the other hand, if network effects are so weak that 
they would not induce standardization, converters tend to increase social 
welfare.52 
The current success enjoyed by social networking sites makes con-
cerns that adapters might forestall investment in establishing social net-
works seem remote. However, the theoretical literature indicating that the 
deployment of adapters may decrease the incentives to invest in social net-
works suggests that it may be a concern worth monitoring. 
II. DATA PORTABILITY AS A SOURCE OF MARKET POWER AND 
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT 
Another potential source of monopoly power is the absence of data 
portability. The most frequently cited concern is that the inability to move 
data from one social networking site to another can create a form of lock-
in.53 Social networks follow different policies. For example, Myspace54 
condones data portability.55 Facebook, in contrast, allows individuals to 
copy their own information as a backup or to move it to a different site, but 
  
 48 Farrell & Saloner, supra note 16, at 32. 
 49 Id.  
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Butts, supra note 14, at 290-91; Michael Geist, Getting Social Networking Sites to Social-
ize, TORONTO STAR (Aug. 13, 2007), http://www.thestar.com/business/article/245647--getting-social-
networking-sites-to-socialize; see also James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 
1192 (2009) (observing the focus on data lock-in without endorsing it); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason 
Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 900 n.50 (2011) (“Switching costs would be re-
duced further if consumers were assured data portability between platforms.”). 
 54 Formerly known as “MySpace,” the company modified its name to “Myspace” in 2010. Press 
Release, Myspace, Inc., Meet the New Myspace (Oct. 27, 2010), available at http://www.myspace.com/
pressroom/2010/10/meet-the-new-myspace. This Article refers to the company as Myspace, unless an 
article title, case caption, or quote uses the old name. 
 55 Michael Arrington, MySpace Embraces Data Portability, Partners with Yahoo, Ebay, and 
Twitter, TECHCRUNCH (May 8, 2008), http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/05/08/myspace-embraces-data-
portability-partners-with-yahoo-ebay-and-twitter.  
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prohibits third parties from copying the same data.56 Social networking pro-
viders could also promote data portability by standardizing the format of 
the data.57 The concern is that the lack of data portability could constitute an 
entry barrier. 
I find the case for standardizing data and mandating data portability to 
be relatively uncompelling. As an initial matter, any form of standardization 
of data formats threatens to structure interactions in ways that can limit the 
functionality of these systems. Moreover, the immediacy and short shelf life 
of much of the information available on social networks limits the need for 
porting historical data. Such concerns are also greatly ameliorated by the 
willingness of social networking sites to facilitate the export of data.58 
Social networking sites also limit scraping so that they can maintain a 
high-level user experience.59 In addition, other scholars have begun to raise 
concerns about the potentially adverse impact of data portability on priva-
cy.60 Once data becomes completely portable, people can easily evade any 
privacy restrictions placed by the initial social networking site simply by 
porting the data over to another venue not subject to those restrictions.61 
Several recent cases illustrate this concern nicely. For example, in 
Slater v. Tagged, Inc.,62 new users to a social networking site called Tagged 
were asked to enter their e-mail addresses and passwords so that Tagged 
could import their address books.63 What end users did not realize is that 
Tagged also sent an e-mail to all of the e-mail addresses in the new users’ 
address books.64 In addition, newspapers report examples of private infor-
mation being scraped off Facebook and posted (with errors) on a dating 
website called Plenty of Fish.65 It is for these reasons that Facebook’s terms 
of use require its users to commit to the following: “You will not collect 
users’ content or information, or otherwise access Facebook, using auto-
  
 56 Scott Gilbertson, Google and Facebook to Join the Data Portability Debate, WEBMONKEY, 
(Jan. 9, 2008), http://www.webmonkey.com/2008/01/google_and_facebook_to_join_the_data_
portability_debate.  
 57 See Chris Saad, How Does Facebook View the World?, MASHABLE (June 4, 2010), http://masha
ble.com/2010/06/04/facebook-data-portability. 
 58 See Jacqui Cheng, Data Portability Finally Comes to Facebook, Plus Friend Groups, ARS 
TECHNICA, (Oct. 6, 2010, 4:13 PM), http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2010/10/data-portability-
finally-comes-to-facebook-plus-friend-groups.ars; Gilbertson, supra note 56. 
 59 See Grimmelmann, supra note 53, at 1193-94. 
 60 See id. at 1194; Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified 
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 153 (2010). 
 61 See Grimmelmann, supra note 53, at 1194. 
 62 Complaint, Slater v. Tagged, Inc., No. 09-CV-3697 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009). 
 63 Id. at 6-7. 
 64 Id. at 7. 
 65 Kristi L. Gustafson, Looks Like You, But Looks Can Be Deceiving, TIMES UNION (Albany, 
N.Y.) (Feb. 14, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.timesunion.com/living/article/Looks-like-you-but-looks-
can-be-deceiving-1012103.php. 
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mated means (such as harvesting bots, robots, spiders, or scrapers) without 
our permission.”66 
Although Facebook does have valid business justifications for prohib-
iting scraping, one can also claim that this policy is intended to thwart the 
emergence of a rival. For example, Google developed an extension to its 
Chrome browser called Facebook Friend Exporter to make it easier to trans-
fer information stored in Facebook to Google+, only to see it blocked by 
Facebook.67 Facebook later blocked another tool designed to perform the 
same task.68 
While this conduct was no doubt frustrating for Google, it is far from 
clear that it constitutes an antitrust violation. As the Microsoft decision 
made clear, “a monopolist does not violate the antitrust laws simply by de-
veloping a product that is incompatible with those of its rivals.”69 Incompat-
ibility is only problematic if it is accompanied by deception, an exclusivity 
agreement, or a technical design that lacks any business justification.70 
Without more, the mere fact that a company refuses to facilitate its rival’s 
business is unproblematic. Moreover, the privacy-related concerns dis-
cussed above (and Facebook’s concomitant inability to ensure that any in-
formation scraped from its site is used properly) represents a sufficient 
business justification to render Facebook’s conduct reasonable. 
The foregoing discussion of data portability underscores the extent to 
which a monopolization claim requires more than proof of market power. 
Indeed, as Judge Learned Hand noted in United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America71 (Alcoa), antitrust law does not reach monopolies obtained 
through natural features of the market, such as when “[a] market may . . . be 
so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the cost of produc-
tion except by a plant large enough to supply the whole demand.”72 Later 
courts have followed suit and held that monopolization does not apply to 
  
 66 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.face
book.com/legal/terms. 
 67 Erica Swallow, How to: Import Your Facebook Contacts on Google+, MASHABLE (July 5, 
2011), http://mashable.com/2011/07/04/google-plus-contacts.  
 68 Stephen Shankland, Facebook Blocks a Second Contact Export Tool, CNET (July 11, 2011, 
9:28 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30685_3-20078435-264/facebook-blocks-a-second-contact-
export-tool. 
 69 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam); 
accord Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The crea-
tion of technological incompatibilities, without more, does not foreclose competition; rather, it increases 
competition by providing consumers with a choice among differing technologies, advanced and stand-
ard, and by providing competing manufacturers the incentive to enter the new product market by devel-
oping similar products of advanced technology.”). 
 70 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 76; Philip J. Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, 
Microsoft, and Beyond, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 281 (2009); see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 
157 F.3d 1340, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 71 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 72 Id. at 430. 
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natural monopolies.73 Commentators have concluded that this applies to 
natural monopolies resulting from network effects.74 To hold otherwise, in 
the words of another leading court of appeals decision, would be to “require 
the impossible—a competitive market under conditions of natural monopo-
ly.”75  
Instead, monopolization doctrine requires that the defendant have en-
gaged in some form of exclusionary conduct, which the Supreme Court has 
described as “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior prod-
uct, business acumen, or historic accident.”76 Various commentators have 
advocated so-called “no fault” monopolization over the years.77 Courts have 
rejected these invitations out of concern that doing so would deter firms 
from engaging in the competition on the merits (through product innovation 
and cost reduction) that the antitrust laws are designed to foster.78 As Judge 
Hand so eloquently put it, “[t]he successful competitor, having been urged 
to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”79 
Simply put, the fact that a firm may possess market power does not by 
itself put it under a duty to help its rivals.80 The mere fact that it is maximiz-
ing its own profits is not sufficient to subject it to liability.81 Whatever lim-
ited duty to deal exists under the Supreme Court’s precedents applies only 
  
 73 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 548 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The 
Sherman Act . . . has not been interpreted to penalize natural monopolies.”); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 
570 F.2d 982, 990-91 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that particular characteristics of natural monopoly make 
it unsuitable for application of antitrust laws absent predatory conduct); Greenville Publ’g Co. v. Daily 
Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 397 (4th Cir. 1974) (“The characteristics of a natural monopoly make it 
inappropriate to apply the usual rule that success in driving competitors from the market is evidence of 
illegal monopolization.”); Lamb Enters., Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 1972) 
(“In a natural monopoly situation any successful competitor gets the market. Thus, it cannot be unrea-
sonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market where such foreclosure is the 
natural result of success in a natural monopoly situation.” (citation and internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); Am. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 323 F.2d 124, 131 (4th Cir. 1963) (“When one has 
acquired a natural monopoly by means which are neither exclusionary, unfair, nor predatory, he is not 
disempowered to defend his position fairly.”); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 
284 F.2d 582, 584 (1st Cir. 1960) (“[A] natural monopoly market does not of itself impose restrictions 
on one who actively, but fairly, competes for it, any more than it does on one who passively acquires 
it.”). 
 74 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 10, at 503 (“Courts cannot normally ‘undo’ network 
effects with the tools of antitrust. Network effects are an inherent part of certain markets, not a ‘market 
failure’ for which the law must necessarily correct.” (citation omitted)). 
 75 Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 76 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
 77 See, e.g., SPULBER & YOO, supra note 11, at 284 & n.6. 
 78 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547-49 (rejecting calls to penalize firms that achieve 
monopoly through superior competitive performance without engaging in predatory conduct). 
 79 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 80 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 600 (1985). 
 81 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). 
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where the alleged monopolist unilaterally abandoned a preexisting, profita-
ble course of dealing.82 These limitations to a firm’s duty, along with the 
privacy-related business justifications, make it unlikely that the refusal to 
facilitate data compatibility will provide the basis for a monopolization 
claim. 
III. TWO EARLY EMERGING EXAMPLES 
Two early cases may offer some clues as to how antitrust will apply to 
social networking sites. The fact that the antitrust claims in both cases were 
dismissed because of a failure to allege exclusionary conduct suggests that 
would-be plaintiffs may be unlikely to prevail. 
A. LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc. 
LiveUniverse is the operator of a rival social networking site called vi-
dilife.com.83 Although users were initially able to incorporate vidilife con-
tent into their Myspace pages, Myspace reconfigured its site to prevent the 
embedding of vidilife videos on Myspace webpages, removed all references 
to vidilife, and even prevented users from including links to vidilife in their 
Myspace profiles.84 
After LiveUniverse filed an antitrust suit regarding Myspace’s con-
duct, the district court dismissed the claim for failure to allege actionable 
exclusionary conduct.85 As an initial matter, “[a] company generally has a 
right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes.”86 Although the Su-
preme Court had imposed a duty to deal in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen High-
lands Skiing Corp.,87 a district court noted that more recently the Court, in 
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,88 
held that Aspen “is at or near the boundary of [Section] 2 liability.”89 More-
over, Trinko held that Aspen applied only to situations where the defendant 
had voluntarily engaged in a profitable course of dealing and subsequently 
sacrificed short-term profits by unilaterally abandoning that course of deal-
  
 82 Id. at 409. 
 83 LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06-6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007), aff’d, 304 F. App’x 554 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at *15. 
 86 Id. at *11 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)) (quota-
tion marks omitted in original). 
 87 472 U.S. 585, 610 (1985). 
 88 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 89 LiveUniverse, 2007 WL 6865852, at *12 (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409). 
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ing in an attempt to secure long-term exclusion of competition.90 LiveUni-
verse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc.,91 in contrast, never involved a voluntary 
agreement between LiveUniverse and Myspace, but rather involved deci-
sions by their users to incorporate content from LiveUniverse into 
Myspace.92 Moreover, the district court held that LiveUniverse had no right 
to free ride on the traffic that Myspace was attracting to its website.93 Last-
ly, the district court rejected LiveUniverse’s attempt to invoke the Mi-
crosoft case as support for its claim that Myspace’s product design change 
constituted exclusionary conduct.94 Not only was Myspace under no obliga-
tion to ensure that its competitor’s products remained compatible with its 
new products, but unlike in Microsoft, Myspace could do nothing to block 
access to vidilife, which remained accessible directly over the Internet. 95 
All Myspace did was to prevent consumers from using its site to do so.96 
The Ninth Circuit endorsed the district court’s reasoning and conclu-
sion in a brief opinion, noting first that, “[a]s a general matter, the Sherman 
Act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer 
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own inde-
pendent discretion as to the parties with whom he will deal.”97 The limited 
exception to this rule recognized in Aspen applied only to unilateral termi-
nations of voluntary arrangements that were profitable.98 In this case, the 
only prior course of dealing alleged by LiveUniverse was between Myspace 
and its users, not between Myspace and LiveUniverse.99 Moreover, Li-
veUniverse had failed to allege that the prior arrangement was profitable to 
Myspace.100  
B. Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc. 
All of the elements previously discussed in this Article—adapters as a 
solution to network effects, exclusionary conduct, and data portability—
came together in Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc. Power Ventures 
offers a website called Power.com, which is designed to allow end users to 
  
 90 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409. 
 91 No. CV 06-6994 AHM (RZx), 2007 WL 6865852 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2007), aff’d, 304 F. App’x 
554 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 92 Id. at *13. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at *15. 
 95 Id. at *15-16. 
 96 LiveUniverse, 2007 WL 6865852, at *15-16. 
 97 LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 F. App’x 554, 556 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Verizon 
Comm’cns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 557. 
 100 Id. 
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integrate all of their social networking contacts into a single site.101 Pow-
er.com uses Facebook login information provided by its users to scrape 
information off Facebook and display it on Power.com.102 In short, Pow-
er.com represented precisely the type of adapter that could dissipate the 
market power stemming from network effects. 
Facebook sued Power Ventures for violating Facebook’s terms of ser-
vice, which in turn violated a plethora of state and federal statutes.103 Power 
Ventures filed a counterclaim alleging, among other things, that Facebook 
had violated the antitrust laws.104 After the district court dismissed the anti-
trust counterclaim without prejudice for lack of specificity,105 Power Ven-
tures filed amended counterclaims only to see them dismissed as well.106  
Power Ventures alleged that Facebook was engaged in exclusionary 
conduct by asking its users to provide it with user names and passwords to 
Gmail, AOL, Yahoo!, Hotmail, and other third-party websites and using 
that information to access those accounts through Facebook while denying 
its competitors from doing the same.107 The district court ruled that the fact 
that other third-party websites allowed Facebook to access them did not 
place Facebook under the obligation to provide third-party websites with 
unfettered access to Facebook.108 Indeed, Ninth Circuit precedent establish-
es that simply introducing a product that is not interoperable with compet-
ing products does not violate the antitrust laws.109 Moreover, “[i]f Facebook 
has the right to manage access to and use of its website, then there can be 
nothing anticompetitive about taking legal action to enforce that right.”110 
Together, LiveUniverse and Power Ventures raise serious questions 
about the likely success of antitrust claims against social networks. Absent 
some other exclusionary conduct, the facts that a social network refuses to 
deal with a rival, designs its website to be incompatible with its competi-
tors, and refuses to enable data portability are unlikely to support antitrust 
liability. 
  
 101 Complaint at 2-3, Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-5780 WDB (N.D. Cal. Dec. 
30, 2008). 
 102 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-5780 JF (RS), 2009 WL 3429568, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 22, 2009). 
 103 Specifically, Facebook alleged that Power Ventures violated the Controlling the Assault of 
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (“CAN-SPAM”) Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
the California Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, state and federal trademark law, and California’s Unfair Competition Law as well as that Power 
Ventures committed direct and indirect copyright infringement. Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at *2. 
 106 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-5780 JW, 2010 WL 3291750, at *1, *13-14 
(N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010). 
 107 Id. at *13. 
 108 Id.  
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at *14. 
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CONCLUSION 
The nuances discussed above underscore the potential hazards of 
adopting simplistic visions of prospective anticompetitive harms posed by 
social networking sites. As the D.C. Circuit noted in Microsoft, “[s]imply 
invoking the phrase ‘network effects’ without pointing to more evidence 
does not suffice to carry plaintiffs’ burden in this respect.”111 Similarly, a 
close analysis of mandating data portability reveals that it is something of a 
two-edged sword. 
The potential misuses of such ideas highlight the key insight in Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.112 that “if the factual 
context renders respondents’ claim implausible—if the claim is one that 
simply makes no economic sense—respondents must come forward with 
more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be 
necessary.”113 Stated more generally, Matsushita teaches that antitrust 
claims cannot be based on generalized concerns about a particular compa-
ny’s size or business conduct. Instead, antitrust claims should be asserted in 
the context of a coherent economic theory and should be based on data con-
sistent with that theory. Any other approach risks protecting competitors 
instead of competition. 
The history of high-tech companies underscores the dangers of playing 
too fast and loose with antitrust claims. While companies such as AT&T 
and IBM once dominated the landscape, IBM no longer makes computers, 
while AT&T has ceased to exist as an independent company (having been 
acquired by SBC).114 In addition, although the merger between America 
Online and Time Warner was once regarded as the end of history, subse-
quent events have revealed that “it was simply the end of . . . $200 billion in 
Time Warner shareholder value.”115 Warning signs exist with respect to 
social networking, as reflected in the LiveUniverse case.116 Whereas 
Myspace was once so dominant that LiveUniverse was able to allege that it 
had 89-percent market share, the company is now teetering on the edge of 
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insignificance.117 This legacy cautions against being too facile in identifying 
putative anticompetitive conduct and demonstrates the importance of re-
maining disciplined in the evaluation of antitrust claims. 
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